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ETHICAL TRAINING IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

The moral or ethical training of children is always an important matter from a pedagogical standpoint, but the question of the moral training of children in the public schools of the United States now threatens to pass from the hands of the pedagogue to those of the politician. The situation in brief is as follows: All taxpayers must, by law, contribute to the support of the public school, yet an active and influential element in several religious bodies protests against the present position of the public school in regard to moral and religious instruction to the extent of supporting their own schools at their own expense, though taxed at the same time to support state schools. To sustain the inevitable steady opposition of these large bodies of citizens, as well as to overcome the equally earnest, though less determined, opposition of those who deem essential the public reading of the Scriptures, or the singing of sacred songs, the public school must deserve and win the

confidence of a large working majority of the people. This it can not do solely on the ground of the excellence of its intellectual training. It must show itself to be morally sound and substantially Christian. It must not and will not permit itself to be used as a medium for inculcating catechisms by churchmen or laymen, for this would involve its destruction. But its ethical training must be positive and effective, even though informal. The great public see the necessity of leaving to the church those phases of religious doctrine that pertain to authoritative teachings about God and the future life, but they will not excuse the schools from training children in those phases of religious truth that pertain to the relations that should exist between man and man, or between the individual and the various institutions of society.

It is the chief purpose of this paper to find within the available resources of the public school a basis for the best possible moral training that can be given in a non-sectarian institution. With this general purpose in view, I invite the attention of the reader, first, to a valid and essential distinction in morality.

On one side morality is subjective and individual, while on the other it is objective and universal. Man may, on the one hand, be viewed in his relation to himself. Conscience is then the supreme question, and a man does right in obeying his conscience, no matter how irrational or self-destructive his deed may be when judged by institutional standards. "As a man thinketh in his heart, so is he." Or, on the other hand, one may view man in his relation to his fellows, and the written or unwritten laws lying at the foundation of all forms of social life become the guide to conduct. "As a man sows so shall he reap." In this objective view of morality man is not only held responsible for his intentions, but also for his deeds. The subjective side of morality is peculiarly the province of the church, the objective of the state. Religion may promise release from penalty upon change of disposition merely, but the

state must make evil deeds return upon the doer, whether he repents or not. This is the fundamental reason for the separation of church and state.

It is to the first of these moral phases that we have hitherto devoted most care in the schools. We have sought to bring about that state of inner freedom that always ensues when volition and judgment agree. We have tried to make the conscience tender, and imperative in its demands. In doing this we have done well, but we have not done everything. It is conceivable that even the Spanish Inquisitors may have regarded themselves as the instruments of Divine will, and consequently have enjoyed the rewards of obedience to conscience. In other words, a subjective standard may, in the eyes of other men or other times, become a monstrous one. It is not to be implicitly trusted, for it is a formal principle only, having no necessary content.

Plainly, then, we have a double task. We must not only make obedience to conscience the supreme law of the soul, but we must impart to the child those ethical ideals that form the content of the highest morality. The problem of the teacher, then, is to reveal the ethical duty of man to man, and to find adequate means for inducing the youthful will to live in accordance with this ethical order, and to submit itself freely to the system of laws revealed in our various institutions; or, in other words, to bring about a permanent harmony between the individual, subjective disposition of the heart, and the laws that condition the stability and progress of human society.

Just as there are two phases of morality, so there are two kinds of moral training;—one hard, stern and rigid, having its basis in abstract right, and unwarmed by any glow of sympathetic feeling; the other combining all the authority of conscience with a glowing disposition for the right. The former method reaches the will through the exercise of dogmatic authority backed up by the fear of punishment. The latter seeks first to reach the heart of the child by revealing something of the inherent beauty and loveliness of

the right as contrasted with the equally inherent ugliness of wrong ; and then to secure ultimate stability of character by using all proper means to build up habits of right action. In other words, it tries to interest the child in the actual ethical content of objective morality, hoping in this way to enlist his disposition in favor of right moral action. What the schools appear to need, then, if they are not to have direct religious instruction, is something that has the same essential content in forms capable of arousing the spontaneous attention and permanent interest of the children. Interest of this sort naturally culminates in desire and motive, so that if we can awaken this interest in that which is rich in ethical content, we shall have no difficulty in developing the right sort of disposition in the children. When this is done the problem of securing habitual right action is greatly simplified.

From the foregoing, it would seem that the teacher has a three-fold problem before him : first, to discover what are the fundamental ethical ideas or ideals ; second, to find the available forms in which they are embodied ; and third, to devise the best pedagogical means for utilizing them in moral training.

Turning now to the field where man must utter himself in his ethical relation to others, we come to four great ideas that lie at the basis of all modern social and economic life.

1. It is the natural impulse of each individual to make himself the end and centre of all that he comes in contact with, to make himself the master to which everything else must be subordinate. This is a natural impulse because each self is in reality the centre to which all its own mental experiences must be related. But this same experience soon teaches him that there are other selves, with claims equal to his own, and that if he would have his own self-hood respected, he must respect that of others. There thus arises practically in the world the idea that Christianity calls *good will*. It is that state of mind in which the validity of a foreign *ego* is recognized, or in which the good of another is

willed as if for self. Its opposite is ill-will, a feeling whose impulse is to injure or destroy or subordinate a foreign *ego*. Good-will is the key to a long list of virtues, such as kindness, benevolence, charity, fidelity, goodness, generosity; while its opposite, ill-will, gives rise to an equally extended list of faults.

2. The second idea comes to light when two individuals strive for the possession of that which, in the nature of the case, only one of them can have. It is the idea of *rights*, which lies at the basis of most of our laws regarding property. A large part of the judicial system of every country is devoted to the securing of justice in the acquisition, possession and disposition of wealth.

3. The third idea is that of requital for good or bad actions, and it demands that the requital shall be adequate to the deed. This idea is the basis of the system of rewards, and especially of punishments, that society has gradually evolved. Institutionalism takes the requital of evil deeds out of the hands of the injured person, and places it in those of the state. The effect is to ward off from others the blow of the evil-doer, making it return upon his own head. This conception is expressed in Michael Angelo's *Last Judgment*, where each shows by his looks that he is but facing the results of his own deeds, which carry their own requital with them.

4. The fourth idea arises from the necessary constitution of society, in which each individual is compelled to enter into combination with his fellows in order to realize his greatest possibilities in economic thrift and rational freedom. It is known as the doctrine of service, in which he serves himself best who best serves others. This principle is not only valid as a desirable moral rule, but it has also a certain business and economic validity quite independent of sentiment. The most successful merchant, other things being equal, is the one who best succeeds in making the public believe that he can serve them better than others. The people may, indeed, be deceived, but it is only to the extent

of their folly that he can successfully depart from the principle. As a religious idea, this thought holds a supreme place. "For whosoever will save his life shall lose it: and whosoever will lose his life for my sake shall find it." "But whosoever will be great among you, let him be your minister; and whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant."

These four ideas reveal the fundamental ethical relations that must exist among the members of a complicated social organism. They are of the very essence of institutionalism, and any violation of their unswerving imperatives carries in itself the seeds of its own punishment. Modern practical Christianity is the realization of these ideals in the world, and it is because this is the truth that modern religious bodies respond so feebly to efforts to carry religion back into the field of abstract dogmas. In these days, faith can not be separated from works.

Along with these four fundamental ideas, embodying the content of morality, there are two others, which, though formal in character, are of the utmost importance to the individual. They pertain to the subjective, or individual, side of man, already mentioned.

1. The first may be called the Idea of Inner Freedom. It is the peace, or harmony, that dwells in the soul of man when his conscience is at rest, when his volition has conformed to the demands of his intelligence, or when his will and his judgment are in accord. A man who has deliberately acted in accordance with his firm belief as to what is right is subjectively free. His conscience approves, and he is at peace with himself, even though at war with the rest of the world. The teacher rightly tries to cultivate the conscientious spirit, but it is no less his duty to inform the judgment regarding the objective ethical relations that are valid in the world, and to enlist the interests and affections of the mind in their behalf.

2. The second formal moral ideal is that of Efficiency of Will. It implies, first, a certain positive force of determi-

nation and vigor of execution. Everybody knows what a weak will is, and how hopeless is the case of the man who can not be counted upon to reduce his good resolutions to concrete practice. The efficient will is the strong will. But it is more. It must, also, be reasonably concentrated in its action; that is, it must make all its efforts work together for the accomplishment of leading purposes. All this, however, is purely formal, and holds of evil as well as good men. No man can be *positively* bad whose will is not strong and concentrated. A truly efficient will, however, must be consistent in its main lines of action, and to be consistent it must be right, for deeds that are consistently evil are wholly self-destructive in the end, whilst there can be no idea of really efficient volitional life where one action contradicts its fellow, as must be the case where one's deeds are partly right and partly wrong. It appears to follow, therefore, that to be truly efficient one's will must be strong, concentrated, and consistent with the real ethical order of the world. But even granting that a will can not be efficient which is not rightly directed, the fact still remains that this principle is purely formal, since it throws no light on what is right or wrong.

We seem now to have found the basal ideas of an ethical system. Four are concrete and two are formal. The forms must not remain empty, but must be filled with the true ethical content. This content, moreover, must not be presented in abstract or generalized form, but must be capable at all points of reaching the understanding and interest of the child. Rules of conduct, therefore, however excellent in themselves, have but little effect on the young. Here we come upon the pedagogical problem again.

Having learned what the fundamental ethical ideas of the world are, we may discuss briefly the conditions under which they may be made valid to children and the various forms in which they are embodied.

It may, in the first place, be remarked that all progress in civilization is but the progress that men in their collective



capacity have made in discovering and embodying in laws and customs the real meaning and force of the concrete ethical principles that have been described.

As the years have passed, each new insight into freedom and economic welfare has sooner or later become embodied in some institution of family, school, church, state or business world. This process has often gone on but slowly when men have become enslaved in political and economic life, but now that all civilization has become so largely democratic, every new revelation of a practicable advance in the realization of ethical ideals has a good chance of becoming embodied in law. We may, therefore, regard our whole legislative machinery as a means for recording the advancing ethical education of the people. It is also true that life under institutional forms is a practical education in the ethical ideals. Even if good-will is not especially enjoined by law, the manifestation of its opposite, ill-will, is prohibited and punished. If one would learn definitely that his neighbor has rights, let him violate a few of them, and the institution of government will give him the information in such a way that he will not soon forget it. In the same way, the law soon teaches man that evil deeds, at least, meet with an adequate requital; that curses, like chickens, come home to roost. In a dim way, perhaps, all the institutions pertaining to business life teach also that we are best served through our own rendering of service. On account of these facts, therefore, any life under institutional forms is an ethical education. Conformity to the rules of the family, the school, the church, the state, the business world, is a practical education in morality that we can not spare. But, however excellent and indispensable this training may be, it is not entirely adequate to our needs. Men are continually tried by our courts, prisoners are perpetually led to jail, the prisons are always full, the gallows never without a victim. People are eternally suffering and even perishing under the requital of their unethical deeds, men are eternally going to the wall, financially, because they

lack the will or the ability to seek the advancement of themselves through the advancement of others. Real altruism is foreign to their knowledge or their dispositions.

The school must help out the other institutions and prevent the present immense waste of human welfare and happiness, by anticipating it, by enabling the child to master himself in thought, and experience ideally what the headstrong, untutored soul must experience really.

In the impressionable years of childhood and youth, while the heart is tender, the imagination vivid, and the apprehension quick, it is possible so to enlist these faculties that the moral victory may be won before the real battle is fought. We do not hesitate to have the child enter into the inheritance that the past has left us in knowledge. No child is asked to start a thousand years behind his time in any great field of human endeavor. Our children now accept the electric light as freely as our grandfathers did the oil lamp or the tallow candle. The same is true in every realm of science and practical life. We seize the advantage gained, and go on to new conquests. Why should it be otherwise in the moral world? Why may not the bitter lessons of the past in the struggle with ethical principles be turned quite as fully to account as the results in the intellectual world? What a weary round of scourgings the race has gone through to arrive at its present state of material, political and ethical freedom! The child is born now, as ever, with all his experiences before him. Must he, for lack of proper education, tread again the thorny path of his race? We do not ask it with regard to his material or intellectual welfare. Why should we with the moral?

Of all the four great ethical ideas, that of requital for our deeds comes home to us with most force, for it is a consequent of which each of the others may be an antecedent. What is the effect of good-will as practically shown? Does not the requital for ill-will return on our own heads, so that, when we are spiting another, we are biting off our own nose? What is the effect of recognizing or violating the rights of

another? of striving to get by giving, and not by stealing? It is, therefore, through the portrayal of requitals that we shall most easily approach the understanding of the child.

We must not, however, in examining these considerations, allow ourselves to forget that the second part of our problem is to discover the forms most available for educational purposes in which these ethical ideals are embodied. Evidently, we shall have our labor for our pains if we search for the embodiment of ethical truths in nature or in natural science, for, as Kant says, it is only the *will* that can be morally good or bad. Only to the extent that all intellectual truth has a bearing on moral truth does natural science have any bearing on ethics. It is, doubtless, a fact that the scientist's passion for the truths of nature, in themselves morally indifferent, may lead to a like reverence for the truths of morality. To this extent only does natural science help moral education. Since, then, ethical relations arise directly from the human will, we must, for the most part, look for their embodiment in that which records in some way the deeds of men.

In its material manifestations, the will of man records itself in material forms upon the face of the earth, in cultivated fields, magnificent cities, stately ships, thundering trains. It finds an expression in the daily toil of millions. On its spiritual side, human will expresses and embodies itself in institutions, such as family, school, church, business and state. History records their growth, and daily life shows their operation. Literature shows the operation of institutions in ideal form. Our chief duty now lies in examining the various spiritual and material manifestations of human will, and in estimating their worth in the moral education of the young.

It is to history that we most naturally turn, for this is the record of man's will in action. It has taken thousands of years for the world to reach its present state of civilization, or, what is the same thing, to embody in its institutions the modern insight into true ethical principles. The millennium

is not yet reached, so that this process is an unceasing one. At every advancing stage there has been a vast inertia of existing forms and customs to overcome—there has always been a conflict between conscience and constitution. One party stands by the law as it is ; the other struggles for the law as it should be. This gives rise to an unending struggle, which, in the past, has usually taken on the form of wars and revolutions. History, therefore, portrays the eternal strife of man in his progress toward national freedom, or toward that state of institutionalism in which there is the highest possible embodiment of self-consistent ethical principles. We read of this struggle in the history of the church, the school, the nation, and the economic world. We see the sway of tyranny, or nationalized ill-will, and the retribution that sooner or later comes to every tyrant ; we trace the efforts of Spain to enrich herself at the expense of others, the attempts of the church to enchain the conscience of man for her own aggrandizement, and we see in every case that retribution has followed, that a wrong ethical principle works out in the end its own destruction. The highest function of history is, therefore, an ethical one. It portrays the ultimate consequences of man's volition on a large scale. It shows, for instance, that national ill-will toward a class carries in itself a punishment that lasts for many generations. The persecution and banishment of the Huguenots in France and the enslavement of the African in America are illustrations. So far as history can be truly interpreted, it is a potent means of giving the young correct ideas of ethical principles, and of enlisting their dispositions on the side of right.

But the ethics of history may become, through misinterpretation, a two-edged sword. The closer we come to our own times the greater becomes the danger of mistake in ethical judgment. Our late war is a case in hand. Most people at the North believe that the rebellion was wrong,—a monstrous iniquity,—while we have evidence that large numbers at the South believe that their cause, though lost,

was just. To many it is a sphinx's riddle to this day to know which was the ethical hero, Grant or Lee, while some appear to think that both were right. If the judgment of adults is subject to such vacillation and contradiction in the ethical bearing of historical events, what can we expect of the young? Not being able to disengage the tangled skeins of right and wrong, their judgment settles into unthinking partisanship. They are now ready to applaud any cause, however iniquitous, if "our side" but approve it. This kind of an ethical education fits men to become the slaves of party, hence the tools of knaves. It would seem, therefore, that for all except men of trained judgment, the ethical lessons of history cannot be clearly perceived. The mind of youth does not seem capable of deducing clearly the more important lessons of history. Centuries often stand between a deed and its ultimate consequences, or requital. There is too much of misleading pomp and circumstance, the lapse of time is too great, the component factors too numerous and too complex for the youthful mind to disentangle the right from the wrong, and to see the end from the beginning. It is only in the carefully edited song and story, biography and memoir, that the child may be led to apprehend something of the ethical mission of history.

But even if history, as presented in our text-books, is an uncertain quantity as regards its usefulness for ethical teaching, the resources of the school are not yet exhausted, for we have this ethical content embodied in the idealized and purified forms of literature, and in the busy daily life of the economic and political world. The ideal and the real should touch each other constantly in education. The real without the ideal renders life prosy and commonplace, while the ideal without the real makes it a dream. It is to the ideal embodiment of ethical content in literature that we shall first address ourselves.

As before remarked, it is not on the pages of history alone that man has recorded the actions originating in his own spirit. The same record in idealized form is found in im-

aginative and dramatic literature. Mythology is only idealized history, while legends, folklore, fairy tales, and dramas are all freighted with the same ethical lessons that are involved in history—the blessings of good-will and justice, fair requital and honest service, and the curse of ill-will, injustice, failure of requital or service; the inevitable return of the deed upon the doer; the moral destruction of those who will not repent of evil deeds, and the punishment of those who do not make restitution for wrong done; the moral salvation of those who do the good, or who undo their evil deeds by repentance and restitution; the moral grandeur of those who obey the law of conscience with unswerving determination. There is not a phase of virtue or its opposite that is not embodied in a thousand forms in classic literature both for young and old.

Unimaginative thought is inclined to deny that any such content is to be found in literature, or, if there, that it can be of any practical utility in the moral education of the young. People of this manner of thinking see no truth in anything not strictly material fact. The Bible story of the traveller on the Jericho road is to them a baseless fabrication if the incident did not actually happen. They have no patience with the ideal in art, for the ideal is never a concrete individual fact. The sublimest ethical truths are mere moonshine and vain imaginings if they chance to be clothed in the garb of fancy. But it is not to this dry and hard materialism, this insensibility to the truth that is not seen and touched, that this part of the present paper is directed. The argument is meant to reach those who can recognize a truth when not dressed in homespun, who see that the imagination makes man free, in that it enables him to break the bonds of a material servitude, by making it possible for him ideally to pass through the experience of the race, learning the lesson that the original experience taught, but without suffering the pain that it cost.

The criminal world is such, largely because it has not imagination enough to see the inevitable consequences of its

deeds. Even the severest punishments do not deter men from crime who have already passed the imaginative period of youth and have entered into a realm of thought in which crime is possible. The hard lines of the "practical," materialistic education demanded by so many of the present day leave no room for a culture of the humanistic feelings; for a development of those high ideals of life and duty that can originate only in a refined imagination, or of that constructive imagination that enables the youth to see a deed, not only in its sensuous attractiveness, but also in its ultimate consequences.

We may turn with confidence, therefore, to the realm of imaginative and dramatic literature, assured that we shall find there the ruling ethical ideals of the world, embodied in such a form as will guide the imagination and hold the interest of the young. No one who has thoughtfully read the world's masterpieces of dramatic literature can doubt their ethical content or deny their influence upon the mind capable of understanding them. Shakespeare is our great institutional dramatist. What the legislator writes in the book of laws, he embodies in the literary forms of art. Each of his dramas opens with an offense against the ethical order as embodied in some institution. Lear shows the disease of absolute authority reacting on family and state. Gloster sins against the family in having an illegitimate son. Macbeth's great deed fits him for the wrong against his king and country; in "As You Like It" Duke Frederick and Oliver are both usurpers, one wronging the state and both the family, and so on throughout the list. Every play moves on from the initial wrong to its culmination, when the world begins to purge itself of the unethical condition of things. This is done in the tragedies by the destruction of the offenders, and in the comedies by their repentance and restitution. In the former, the offender becomes tragic, not merely because he is punished for a crime, but because he has not had the wisdom or the strength to choose the higher of two contradictory principles, both of which are

valid within their own proper range of application. Thus to cherish and defend one's own state is right and commendable, but to do so when a higher duty calls one at the same time to cherish and defend the whole nation, even at the expense of the state, furnishes the material for a tragedy. These tragedies also teach us that it is possible so to offend against institutions that it is impossible to escape the consequences of our deeds, even though the most abject contrition should seize the heart. It is quite possible for men to commit the unpardonable sin against law. On the other hand, the comedies show us the possibility of mediation when our deeds have not gone so far that repentance and restitution are useless or impossible. Antonio is a violator of the Christian principle of charity or good-will, and falls consequently under the hatred and into the clutches of the Jew ; while Shylock, by education and ill treatment, would vent his ill-will against the Christian, even to the extent of taking his life. Yet both repent and cancel their evil deeds, through the mediatory efforts of Portia.

Similarly, Dante's Divine Comedy is but a picture of human life. A man is in the Inferno when ruled by his animal nature, when he denies the validity of good-will, justice, fair requital, service. He is in the Purgatorio when he is purging himself of his stains and burning them out by resisting temptation. He is in the Paradiso when he has come to stand in right ethical relations to his fellows in the institutional life. Faust, too, goes through his struggle with evil in the form of the modern devil, a devil devoid of horns and tail, indeed, but without any diminution of the traditional Satanic virtues. What is Homer but a more boyish exposition of this same eternal struggle in which the race has ever been plunged? The opening is the same :—"I sing the wrath of Peleus' son," says the poet. But the wrath of Peleus' son, like that of other sons, soon passes its proper limits. Homer tells of the wrong done by Agamemnon, king of men ; the unreasoning rage of Achilles, which passes from just indignation to irrational hate ;



the return of his deed upon himself in the death of his friend Patroclus, and in his own diminished importance. Here is the same lesson coming to us from the boyhood of the race. But the Iliad and Odyssey are themselves based upon legends and myths of gods and men, which still bear the story of the struggle of man in his efforts to be free. They are, as Dr. Harris says, the transfigured history of the race, and in them the experience of the race is embodied.

It is, however, a somewhat serious task to distinguish between the literature that is *childlike* and that which is *childish*. Nothing could be more insipid than the manufactured juvenile literature that crowds the modern press. As Rosenkranz says, the best literature for children from their seventh to their fourteenth year consists of that which is honored by nations and the world at large. This is literature that has grown out of the experience of the race when in its earlier or more childlike stage. It always appeals to childhood, for it is in the *naïve* form that children can always understand. The enduring early literature of every nation has thus a charm and value that never grow old. We have a living example of this in the stories of the Old Testament up to the separation of Judah and Israel. Rosenkranz remarks: "These patriarchs, with their wives and daughters, these judges and prophets, these kings and priests, are by no means ideals of virtue from the standpoint of our modern lifeless morality, which would smooth out of its model-stories for the dear children everything that is hard and uncouth. For the very reason that the shadow side is not wanting here, and that we find envy, vanity, evil desire, ingratitude, craftiness, and deceit among these fathers of the race and leaders of God's chosen people, have these stories so great an educational value."\* I quote also Dr. Harris, in the same volume:† "Every child should read as indispensable the stock of stories which furnish general types of character and situation. 'Robinson Crusoe,' 'Gulliver's

\* Philosophy of Education, p. 84.

† Ibid., pp. 85-6.

Travels,' 'Don Quixote,' the 'Arabian Nights' (Hale's Edition, published by Ginn & Co.), Plutarch's 'Lives,' Homer's 'Iliad' and 'Odyssey,' and the dramas of Shakespeare should be read sooner or later; earlier than these the old English stories and fairy-tales, and even 'Mother Goose's Melodies.' A scale thus ascending from the earth to the fixed stars of genius furnishes pictures of human life of all degrees of concreteness. The meagre and abstract outline is given in the nursery tale, and the deep, comprehensive grasp is found in Shakespeare. The summation of the events of life in 'Solomon Grundy' has been compared to the epitome furnished by Shakespeare in the 'Seven Ages,' and the disastrous voyage of the 'Three Men of Gotham' is made a universal type of human disaster arising from rash adventure."

These are but hints of literature that is valuable in its ethical content, but with these ideas for a guide one may take Mary E. Burt's "Literary Landmarks," and select from it a full course of literature from the Kindergarten to the High School, both for reading and other use in the school-room.

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Besides this ideal presentation of ethical content in imaginative and dramatic literature, we have in the bustling daily life about us a perpetual illustration of ethical or unethical principles reduced to concrete practice. Benevolence and malevolence, justice and injustice, requital of good and bad deeds, public and private service to others, are illustrated before our very eyes every day, so that the thoughtful teacher needs but to induce his pupils to look about them in order to bring the most powerful reinforcement to what they have learned and felt as they viewed the world in the magic mirror of literature.

The economic world busies itself with getting a living, with the production and use of wealth, and in these activities men reveal very clearly the ethical forces that govern their action. Moralists have not always recognized the function

of the intellect in our volitional and ethical life, and we must pause a moment to draw a corollary from the ethical principles already evolved. We have seen that, on its objective side, morality has a validity independent of subjective disposition, for men are held responsible for their deeds quite irrespective of any contrition they may feel after the deeds are done. If a man is imprudent or foolish, he must suffer the consequences of his folly, however pure his intentions. This truth is fully recognized in the *Divine Comedy*, for after entering the gate of the *Inferno* the guide speaks as follows:

“We to the place have come, where I have told thee  
Thou shalt behold the people dolorous,  
Who have foregone the good of intellect.”

Inspection leads us to conclude that most social evils arise because men have forgone the good of intellect—from improvidence in caring for the means of producing wealth as well as foolish waste in its use. It is no uncommon sight in the country to see the plows rusting in the fence-corners, the harvesters rotting under leaky sheds or in the open air, or used as chicken-roosts; to see fences falling into ruins, barns tumbling down, exposing stock to the inclemency of the weather; to find houses with leaky roofs, smoky chimneys, paintless weather-boarding, broken windows and crumbling walls. Within such tenements we find listless men, sad-eyed women and ragged, unkempt children. Town and city life present their counterparts to these scenes. Folly and ignorance also rival each other in the squandering and unwise use of hard-earned means. The material starting-point of a sound ethical life lies in giving the children something of an insight into prudence in gaining and using wealth, in care for tools and clothing, in cultivating cleanliness, neatness, economy; for slovenliness, filth and general improvidence are utterly incompatible with any considerable development of moral excellence. It would be an easy and natural transition from the reading of *Robinson Crusoe*, which is an ideal picture of the development of man

in his struggle to create and use the means of economic production, to the production, use and proper care of the various implements for gaining wealth.

When we come to the ethical ideas that fall under the general category of good-will, such as benevolence, kindness, charity, we shall find a rich and varied embodiment of them in practical life. Thirty years or more ago, a Pennsylvania man named Jesse W. Fell, came to the spot that is now Normal, Illinois, then a treeless plain. Beneficence with him took the form of tree planting, and he saw to it that every street in the town was abundantly supplied with trees. This was before the days of real estate "booming," so that what Mr. Fell did was not speculation, but missionary work. Long before he died the town had become what it always will remain, an undying monument to his honor. Every neighborhood can match this deed in some form of public service, made at a time when most needed and least attainable through the ordinary channels.

Before the days of lighthouses, men used to keep fires burning on the shore to warn sailors of dangerous points, or to guide them into the harbor; others would build roads or bridges; still others set an example to a whole neighborhood by keeping their fences in repair, by mowing the weeds along the roadside. Near Swarthmore is an old stone bridge bearing an inscription saying that it was erected in 1811, for the benefit of the public. It is over a deep, and otherwise almost impassable gully.

In those days, probably no form of public beneficence was more needed, both for convenience and for establishing an ideal of highway improvement in the minds of the public. Similarly in the west, where mud is plenty and stone is scarce, farmers here and there living near gravel banks have gravelled short stretches of bad road. The public are learning the lesson and now hundreds of miles of gravelled road are being laid at public expense all over the country. These are but humble examples of what timely beneficence

on the part of individuals has been able to accomplish. On every hand we find parks, roads, bridges, monuments, schools, hospitals, and splendid educational institutions that owe their origin to individual bounty. Daily observation and the daily press will record countless examples of gratuitous benefits to society.

In similar way the great virtue of justice between man and man may be exemplified in a thousand ways by the daily experience of any country village or community, while the requital that comes from infractions of the rules of justice may be amply viewed in any police court, and reinforced by the newspapers.

The greatest idea of modern civilization is that of service to self through service to others. Each contributes his mite to the good of all and gets it back vastly multiplied. Coöperation is the method of civilization. It is this fact that saves mankind from becoming a horde of hungry beasts all competing for the same morsel of food. It is also the central thought of the Christian religion. Service is the watchword of the Master. We should have little patience with the idea that a man can serve his fellows only as he gives up voluntarily a part or the whole of what he has accumulated by prudence and self-denial. He serves them truly in every piece of honest work he does. We sometimes complain that our railroad magnates accumulate great wealth, but what are the most magnificent private fortunes ever amassed in comparison with the vast service these road builders have rendered the country by opening it up to settlement everywhere, by developing its boundless resources, by bringing a market to every door, in short by rendering coöperation possible among a great people. We must show our children that service to others is the key to true business success. It is only as the people are befooled that the commercial trickster can thrive, for the most certain way to get is to give, not to steal. To the extent of their knowledge, people buy of those who will give them the most value for their money. The child must have it indelibly

impressed upon his mind that the only way to enduring success in business is to work consistently, persistently, and continuously to serve others, and that sham and shoddy in business dealings is the road to ruin as well to shame.

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In addition to the ethical relations that should exist between men as individuals, there is a set of larger and not less important ethical relations that should exist between the individual and bodies of men in their collective capacity, *i. e.*, between the individual and the various institutions of society, particularly the state.

As we have seen, dramatic literature portrays these relations ideally in tragedy and comedy, by showing that men attain real freedom only as they conform to the highest institutional organizations. In practice we enter these larger ethical fields when we begin to become conscious of our life as members of those various political organizations that we collectively call the state. The brother now becomes the citizen. No supporter of public education will question the propriety or need of training pupils of the public school in political ethics. A manifestation of this feeling is seen in the recent rage for the teaching of what is called patriotism, the most prominent instrumentalities for which appear to be a fife and drum and a flag. But however inadequate, not to say irrational, the popular ideals may be, the fact that there is such a movement indicates a general recognition of a real need.

Our main reliance heretofore for teaching political ethics has been the study of United States history, but for reasons already pointed out, this has proved ineffective. Not much insight into political duties, or much permanent disposition to do them, is cultivated by the ordinary school history, which consists of descriptions of conquests, campaigns and battles, together with brief and formal statements of their causes and results. A much more efficient method is to make a detailed study of the nearest and most obvious political forms under which we live. This study should embrace

the present facts and how they came to be. Children should be set to a study of the town, its origin, its methods of work, the rights and duties of citizens and officials. They should be led to investigate the subject of taxation, its purpose, its rightfulness, its methods, justice and injustice, its benefits and necessity; what rôle it has played in wars and revolutions, and what the rights and duties of citizens are concerning it. In similar ways students should make a detailed study of county, city and state; of written constitutions and of the organizations, rights, duties and privileges of political parties. This is the root out of which history must grow, if it is to have any ethical vitality.

Several works on civil government, recently produced in America, are admirably adapted for training pupils in political ethics. The exposition in the text is clear, interesting and genetic, while many of the questions and directions used in connection with the text could hardly be more suitable for a development of true political ethics had they been consciously framed for that purpose. Here, for example, are a few:—

- (1) Are there people who get no benefit from their payment of taxes?
- (2) Are the benefits in proportion to the amounts paid?
- (3) What had taxes to do with the French Revolution?
- (4) What had taxes to do with the American Revolution?
- (5) Is it a misuse of the funds of a city to provide for the Fourth of July celebration? To expend money in entertaining guests? To provide flowers, carriages, cigars, wines, etc., for guests?
- (6) What is meant by subordinating public office to private ends? Cite instances from history.
- (7) Has the state a right to direct the education of its youth? To assist private schools with public funds?
- (8) Are women who do not vote represented in town government? Are boys and girls?
- (9) Is lying a crime or a sin? May it ever be both?
- (10) Are courts of any benefit to the vast number who are never brought before them?
- (11) Is it always one's duty to keep out of court?

- (12) Should a serious disturbance break out in your town, whose duty would it be to quell it? Suppose this duty should prove too difficult to perform, then what?
- (13) Should a lady be insulted in your presence, what would you have a right to do? What would be your duty?

These questions, taken at random from hundreds of similar ones, show that the student is constantly facing his own inevitable ethical judgments concerning what a man ought to be and do in his relations to the public. The whole machinery of government, in its legislative, executive and judicial aspects, is examined under the electric light of ethical principles. The virtues, good-will, justice, requital and service are now applied practically in a larger field, but they are seen to be the same immutable principles, equally binding upon the humblest citizen and the greatest statesmen, not only in their daily walks among friends and neighbors, but also in their relations to the public, whether in the town meeting or in national halls.

Summing up the essential points of this paper in a word, we may say:—To the daily discipline of the school, both in intellectual study and in conduct, we must look for a development of a sensitive conscience and a vigorous volitional power; while literature and history, economics, and social and political science must, as the bearers of moral ideals, be our main reliance for guiding the disposition, firing the heart, and enlightening the moral understanding.

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